Joseph V. Micallef is the author of a bestseller of military history and world affairs and a keynote speaker. Follow him on Twitter @JosephVMicallef.
In 1972, President Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the People’s Republic of China. The visit, planned several years ago, marked the resumption of direct diplomatic contacts between China and the United States, after almost a quarter of a century of political isolation.
The thaw culminated in 1979, when the United States established full diplomatic relations with China.
Nixon’s visit was motivated by a desire to gain more influence in the United States’ relations with the Soviet Union and to guarantee Beijing’s assistance in negotiating a peace agreement between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. against the backdrop of increased Soviet power around the world, especially the dramatic growth of the Soviet blue-water navy and Moscow’s broad support for subversive movements around the world.
The opening to China also came at a time when Soviet-Chinese relations were deteriorating. The condition was reinforced by repeated military clashes between China and the USSR, along the Ussuri River border between the two countries, in 1969. There were widespread rumors at the time that Moscow had considered a nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear testing facilities in Xinjiang . Amid a rapid increase in Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese leaders concluded that the USSR posed a greater threat to China than the US
Nixon’s dramatic detente with the Chinese was described at the time as “playing the card of China”, a term that is now enshrined in history books.
Let’s move forward half a century later. China and the United States have now become each other’s main opponents. They are involved in a wide-ranging military, economic, technological and diplomatic competition around the world.
Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union, no longer commands the status of a global superpower enjoyed by the USSR. With an economy smaller than that of Texas and heavily dependent on the export of raw materials, mainly oil and gas, it has little prospect of regaining that status.
Moscow, however, still commands a sizable army, can project significant military power along its periphery and retains a large nuclear arsenal of intercontinental reach and an extensive military-industrial-technological complex.
Now that Russia is the weakest country in the US-China-Russia triumvirate, will Russian President Vladimir Putin try to play his own “card from China” to find an advantage against the US?
Russia and China
In the past decade, Moscow has significantly expanded its economic relations with China, which today is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. It is generally among the top three global importers of most commodities. As one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon exporters, it makes sense for Russia to seek new markets in China, especially since its ability to expand its energy exports to the European Union (EU) has been hampered by American and European sanctions imposed on Moscow after its seizure. 2014 of Crimea.
These sanctions have also closed off access to capital from Western financial institutions, so Moscow has increasingly sought out Beijing to finance its energy and other resource development projects. Chinese capital, for example, has played a prominent role in financing the Yamal LNG project and will play an important role in underwriting Gazprom’s $ 55 billion Power of Siberia pipeline. This project will develop the Chayanda and Kovykta gas fields in Yakutia and build a gas pipeline to transport gas to Heihe in Heilongjiang, where it will connect with the existing Heihe-Shanghai gas pipeline.
Beijing incorporated the maritime route of the Northeast Russian Passage through Russia’s various arctic seas into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure development program, designating it the “Polar Silk Road”.
Moscow also played a role in modernizing China’s armed forces. Historically, China has been one of Russia’s largest arms customers, second only to India. In 2018, China accounted for about 14% of Moscow’s arms exports, totaling about $ 15 billion.
Russia supplied China with the Su-35 multi-purpose fighter. The Su-35 carries guided air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, as well as conventional and intelligent bombs. The two countries are also working together to develop a heavy-duty helicopter for military use.
And the Kremlin is supplying China with six long-range S-400 air defense systems. This is the same system that was recently purchased by Turkey. The Russian systems will be added to the existing air defense network in China. The deployment of the S-400 could allow China to create a no-fly zone over the Taiwan Strait.
Russia is also helping China build an early warning system to identify intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Currently, only the USA and Russia have this capability.
Russia and China have also been expanding the scope of their joint military exercises. Before 2018, these joint exercises revolved around counterterrorism scenarios. Starting with the Vostok-2018 exercise, joint exercises now emphasize defensive and counterattack training and coordination.
Playing the Card of China
Putin was not shy about giving hints that he would consider a more formal alliance with China. On October 20, at the most recent meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin, when asked about a potential military alliance with the PRC, replied: “It is possible to imagine anything. We have not set that goal for ourselves. But in principle, too we will not exclude you. “
The Valdai Discussion Club is a Moscow-based think tank and discussion forum, established in 2004. It has often been used as a place to signal changes in Russian politics or to launch test balloons.
On the other hand, despite the advantages of greater Sino-Russian cooperation, Russian and Chinese interests diverge significantly.
Although China has accommodated Russia within its BRI, the program runs counter to Russia’s long-term interests. The BRI, if successful, will attract the former Soviet states of central Asia, the so-called “stans” (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan) to China’s economic orbit and, presumably, to its policy and diplomatic too.
Moscow intended to reintegrate these former Soviet republics into the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union and common market, and to leverage their geographic access to European energy markets to obtain transit fees and political advantages in exporting Central Asia’s energy resources to Europe. . If these energy exports go to the east, to China, however, Moscow will have much less influence over the “stans”, even though, in the short term, it may offer access to the existing Russian gas pipeline and railway infrastructure. In the long run, however, these countries will find themselves competing directly with Russia to export hydrocarbons to China.
Although the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement apparently resolved the border dispute between the two countries, Chinese historians, with Beijing’s tacit approval, continued to criticize the “unequal treaties” signed between the Russian Empire and the Ching Dynasty in the 19th century, arguing that the disputed territory should be returned to China. The Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Treaty of Beijing (1860) transferred about 600,000 square miles of Chinese territory in Manchuria and western China to Russian control.
At the 18th and 19th Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese President Xi Jinping, for example, called for “the recovery of sovereignty over the lost Chinese territories with the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers”.
In addition, there are currently millions of Chinese immigrants, both legal and illegal, in the Russian Far East. Moscow turned a blind eye to Chinese migration, partly because the region suffers from a chronic labor shortage and also because much of legal immigration is linked to Chinese investments in the Russian Far East.
Russian inhabitants of the region have argued that illegal migration is in fact a Chinese invasion and have expressed concern about Beijing’s intention to retake its historic territory and possibly more. These concerns were emphasized in a 2015 film by local filmmakers, “China – A Deadly Friend”, which has become an internet sensation in Russia and has been widely seen.
It is not clear, however, what China gains from a formal, military or other alliance with Russia. Less than 2% of China’s trade is with Russia, compared to about 20% with the United States. Closer relations with Russia will not affect this needle in any significant way. As long as the US and EU continue to impose sanctions on Russian energy companies, China’s energy demand and investment capital will continue to give it the edge in dealing with Moscow.
A military alliance between the two countries would also pose a significant risk to China, linking it to a declining power that could lead Beijing to conflicts it would rather avoid.
The prospect of a Russia-China alliance poses significant challenges for the US, especially for its military stance in East Asia and the Western Pacific. It is not surprising that the Kremlin used this threat to gain more influence against the United States. Even Russia is not alone in this respect. Beijing may find it equally useful to play the “Russia card” to expand its influence against the US
While the interests of Russia and China diverge significantly over the long term and, in many cases, are hostile, both countries will use an expansion of military and economic cooperation in the short term to seek more influence against the US, in part to minimize the impact American sanctions against any of the countries.
Furthermore, even if their cooperation stops long before a military alliance, a continued expansion of Sino-Russian military ties and strategic coordination is problematic for US and Chinese naval access to Russian Pacific ports, such as Vladivostok, for example. , would pose a significant challenge. to the US naval domain in the western Pacific.
Likewise, the possibility of Beijing coordinating a movement against Taiwan with a comparable Russian movement against the Baltic countries, while highly unlikely, cannot be ruled out either.
Even more important is the related issue of the United States seeking to normalize its relations with Moscow so that it can play its “Russia card” in its negotiations with Beijing.
In the end, neither Russia nor China can choose to pursue a formal military alliance. Simply hinting at a potential may be enough to seek leverage. Even if Putin was willing to play his card with China, it is not clear whether Beijing would be willing to accommodate him.
Regardless of what each country does, however, this card game is just beginning.
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