National Review
Trump’s decision in Morocco was right
Near the end of President Trump’s administration, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This movement sparked loud protests, mainly from James Baker, John Bolton and Senator James Inhofe (R., Okla.). For reasons that are not convincing, the three have long opposed Morocco’s territorial claims and are in favor of a process that is likely to weaken the kingdom, an important US ally in a dangerous region. In addition, his proposals could hand over the territory to Polisario, a remnant of the Cold War that cannot reasonably be expected to play Morocco’s role in the fight against terrorism and extremism. The White House announcement states that the United States affirms, as previous administrations claim, its support for Morocco’s proposal for autonomy as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute over Western Sahara. Therefore, as of today, the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the entire territory of Western Sahara and reaffirms its support for Morocco’s proposal for serious, credible and realistic autonomy as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute over the territory. Western Sahara. The United States believes that an independent Saharawi state is not a realistic option to resolve the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only viable solution. We urge the parties to start discussions without delay, using Morocco’s autonomy plan as the only framework for negotiating a mutually acceptable solution. Observe the ingredients: (1) Previous administrations supported the formula for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty; (2) it is the only realistic formula; (3) negotiations must begin. The additional factor I mentioned above is not stated: Deliberately destabilizing Morocco would be a meaningless policy for the United States. The objections of former Secretary of State Baker and former national security adviser Bolton are essentially that the Trump administration’s decision overturned decades of US policy and international law. Mr. Baker, who also served as a UN special envoy for Western Sahara, called this “a surprising step back from the principles of international law and diplomacy that the United States has adopted and respected for many years” and said he was “a and an unfortunate change in the longstanding policy of the United States under the Democratic and Republican governments. ”That policy, he said,“ has always taken a more or less neutral stance in support of the United Nations’ efforts to determine the future of that territory and of his people, in a way that supports the principle of self-determination. ”Bolton’s point of view was firmly expressed in an essay on Foreign Policy:“ Trump’s decision to throw the Sahrawi people under the bus ditches leaves three decades of American support for their self-determination through a referendum by the Sahrawi people on the future status of the territory. ”Senator Inhofe said that since 1966,“ The international community has a policy clear and defined: Western Sahara deserves a referendum of self-determination to determine its own future. The United States has supported this policy for decades and has been working to hold a self-determination referendum. Until today, this administration has continued our long history, which has remained consistent among administrations ”. But these claims are really wrong. When Baker raised this issue for the United Nations in the 1990s, he developed a proposal then known as the “Baker Plan”. A first draft, in 2000, called for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and was rejected by Polisario and Algeria. A second plan was endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2003 and required five years of local self-government, followed by a referendum on independence. Morocco rejected the plan precisely because it presented the option of independence. Soon after that, Baker resigned from the UN post. During that period, during President George W. Bush’s first term, I was senior director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council. Baker talked to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice about Western Sahara, and I believe it was largely the Bush administration’s refusal to support the Baker Plan that led to Baker’s resignation. Why do we reject it? We understand three critical things. The first and most important was that it was simply impossible for the king of Morocco to approve independence from Western Sahara without destabilizing his own government – with potentially huge consequences for North Africa and the interests of the United States. Moroccans are divided by many disputes in their internal policies, but are united on the issue of Western Sahara. The 1975 “Green March”, organized by the king’s father, Hassan II, in which 350,000 Moroccans entered Western Sahara, was a turning point for the Moroccan government. In fact, neither Hassan nor the current ruler, King Mohammed VI, has ever thought of letting the region separate from Morocco ever since. Doing so would undermine public support for the monarchy and the government, and weaken both. I remember, I hope exactly, a comment from Baker that his plan envisaged a five-year delay in holding the independence referendum, and that during that period Morocco would probably be able to encourage more Moroccans to move to West Sahara and become eligible to vote there. If the government were energetic and intelligent about this, surely Morocco could win the independence referendum. But this comment showed exactly the problem with the Baker Plan: it would have forced Morocco to recognize and accept the legitimacy and the possibility of losing part of its territory and seeing it become a Polisario State. Doing so was precisely what was dangerous for the government and the monarchy, whatever predictions were made about the results of the referendum. The second thing that we, in the Bush administration, understood was wrong with the Baker Plan, was that it could have led to the creation of a Polisario State in Western Sahara. There are many reasons why this was and is still a bad idea. On the one hand, Polisario has had the financial, diplomatic and military support of Algeria for decades. Morocco and Algeria remain rivals; relationships are “strained” and “poor”; Algeria recently denounced the establishment of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel; and the land border between them has been closed since 1994. The independence of Western Sahara would mean that Morocco’s land borders consisted of Algeria and what would likely be an Algerian dependency, the new state of Polisario. This would hardly be in favor of Morocco’s security, prosperity and stability. This could mean that Morocco had no open land borders, and the fighting in late 2020 was caused by Polisario’s actions to block the land border between Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco and the United States have a long and deep relationship, and Morocco is a great non-NATO ally. As the State Department says: Morocco and the United States share common concerns and consult on security, political and economic issues and sustainable development. The United States designated Morocco as an important non-NATO ally in 2004, and the American and Moroccan military perform joint exercises and training. Morocco is a strong partner in counterterrorism efforts and works closely with US security forces to protect the national security interests of both countries. The US and Morocco coordinate their efforts to promote regional stability and security, including through the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The Congressional Research Service summarizes that “successive US administrations have seen Morocco as an important regional partner in security, trade and development. . . . US-Morocco security cooperation is robust. ”It is inconceivable to think of this type of security relationship that exists with a Polisario State. How, then, would pursuing this new dynamic be in the interest of the United States? Finally, the third thing we understood was that Western Sahara has never been an independent state in history. There was not and there is no urgent historical, political or legal reason to make it one. (For a discussion of the legal aspects, see the discussion by Faculty of Law professor Antonin Scalia Eugene Kontorovich.) If the United States should support an independence referendum for Western Sahara, why not Scotland and Catalonia? Why not Quebec and Wales? With these and other considerations in mind, the United States rightly rejected the Baker Plan. But we also encourage the Moroccan government to develop a credible autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and so it was. In 2007, the United States publicly called the Moroccan plan “a serious and reliable proposal to provide real autonomy for Western Sahara”. Not even the United States was alone: also in 2007, “The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the plan offered a constructive step towards negotiations and the possibility of ‘a political solution endorsed by all parties within the framework of the United Nations’” . during the administration of George W. Bush, but in 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the press after a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco that “our policy has not changed and I thank you for asking the question because I think it is important to reaffirm On here . . . that there was no change in policy. ”Both countries reaffirmed their views again on October 30, 2020 at the United Nations (while criticizing Polisario’s blockade actions on the border with Mauritania). Previous US support for the Moroccan autonomy plan did not go as far as the United States took in December 2020, finally recognizing Moroccan sovereignty. But that step was certainly not the complete and “surprising” break with previous US positions, as Baker called it. Instead, it was a logical progression from what had been for more than a decade, under the administrations of both parties, the position of the USA: that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty was the best realistic option. The UN special envoy to the region in 2005-2008, the late Peter Van Walsum, explained why in 2007: As the Council had made clear from the beginning that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the issue of Western Sahara and, more specifically, I had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim to sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that a Sahara Independent Westerners were not a realistic proposition. . . . . My conclusion [was] that an independent Western Sahara is not an achievable goal. Van Walsum was right. It is worth noting how close the White House declaration of December 2020, quoted above, follows its logic: “The United States believes that an independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option to resolve the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only viable solution. “There are, in fact, two possible paths for the region: the endless continuation of the conflict and a negotiation that aims to guarantee real autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. In recognizing Moroccan sovereignty, the United States they increased the pressure for a serious negotiation of autonomy that could end the conflict. No other way will take us there.