Second delayed dose versus standard Covid-19 vaccination regimen

We recommend following the standard regime

Nicole Lurie, MD, MSPH

Public health leaders must make the best decisions they can with the science available, balancing the health of the population, social and economic concerns and the need to maintain public confidence. Data for decision making is rarely available when needed, but the “scope review” is always ready to judge the decisions that have been made. US scientific agencies (the National Institutes of Health, the FDA and CDC) and vaccine developers are committed to making recommendations for Covid-19 vaccines that are guided by science.

My recommendation is that at the moment, in the United States, we should not delay the second dose of the mRNA vaccine beyond the intervals evaluated for its emergency use authorization. Although the immune response to the first dose is unlikely to degrade rapidly, it is incomplete and there is no data to indicate how long a second dose can be delayed without compromising effectiveness. We do not even know the duration of immunity produced by the two-dose regimen or how the timing of the dosage affects immunity in the elderly and immunocompromised people, who are responsible for most hospitalizations and deaths. Substantially delaying a second dose can simultaneously leave these people inadequately protected and hinder progress towards the goal of alleviating the increase in hospitalizations.

Populations essential to social and economic functioning, such as frontline health personnel and other essential workers, need to be assured that, if vaccinated, they can expect a high level of protection and can work more safely. Postponing a second dose cannot provide this guarantee and may have an adverse impact on your future desire to work or be vaccinated.

Some models have suggested that using a less effective vaccine or postponing a second dose to deliver the first doses to more people will end the pandemic sooner.10.11 However, these models do not take into account the potential degradation of the immune response or the side effects of such decisions on vaccine acceptance. Many people are skeptical about vaccines, fearing that the speed of development has required alternative solutions and that political pressure has influenced vaccine recommendations. Suddenly changing dosing recommendations puts public confidence at serious risk and prevents the desire to be vaccinated. Covid-19 cases have already occurred in vaccine containers, as seen in phase 3 tests, which will raise questions about the delayed second dose strategy and undermine confidence in the vaccine launch. If these emerging cases appear to occur more frequently before the second dose, confidence will be further compromised, delaying the end of the pandemic and social and economic recovery.

The appearance of variants of SARS-CoV-2 implies that the virus is under evolutionary pressure. Some have postulated – although this is speculative – that subinhibitory levels of antibody response before a second dose, if generalized, could contribute to the selection of antigenic variants that could escape current vaccines.12 While we now know how to make Covid-19 vaccines, designing, testing, manufacturing and administering a vaccine against a new variant will take time and be challenging.

Currently, our nation is unable to rapidly administer the doses it has. Supply restrictions are likely to ease within a month or two as manufacturing becomes more efficient and other vaccines are likely to be available. In the meantime, vaccines are not the only tool to end this pandemic. In the short term, adherence to basic public health measures is projected to save 1.5 times more lives than vaccines.13 As we increase vaccination, I strongly recommend that we use science to quickly assess alternative approaches to expanding vaccine delivery (eg, second dose delayed, half dose and use of adjuvants that can increase dose savings) to answer critical questions for now and in anticipation of new vaccine-resistant strains.

The disclosure forms provided by the author are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.

Dr. Lurie is a strategic consultant for the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). The views expressed do not represent those of CEPI.

This article was published on February 17, 2021, at NEJM.org.

Author Affiliations

From the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo.

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