National Review
How China crushed Hong Kong’s democracy
On March 11, an annual staff gathering stamped a plan by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to destroy most of what remains of Hong Kong’s democratic processes. At the “Two Sessions” meeting, or Lianghui, more than 5,000 members of the CCP’s elite – members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Conference – adopted the “Decision on Improving the HKSAR Electoral System” for a vote of 2895–0, with one abstention. Party officials welcomed the emergence of “a new democratic system with Hong Kong characteristics”, an easy denial of Hong Kong’s proud tradition of limited but vivid democracy. In fact, what is to come is an electoral system in Hong Kong with characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party. The approved changes in the “Two Sessions” will restructure the Hong Kong Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC) in order to strengthen the CCP’s control over electoral processes. In addition to electing the head of the Executive, the EAC will now elect a greater proportion of the members of the Legislative Council and will participate directly in the nomination of all candidates for the organ. The most potent change is to introduce a pro-Beijing litmus test for candidates: from now on, their “patriotism” will need to be established. Lo Kin-hei, chairman of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong, called this “the biggest regression of the system since the transfer”. Xi Jinping’s motives behind the idea of “patriots ruling Hong Kong” are obvious. He and other CCP leaders believe that Hong Kong officials have been overly tolerant of democratic opposition for the past 20 years, giving Hong Kong’s inhabitants the impression that they could fight the central government, which they imagine would not dare to turn over. match. because of the interests of so-called foreign powers in Hong Kong. The central government had been trying to make Hong Kong a positive example of “one country, two systems” to attract Taiwan. But although the model was not accepted in Taiwan, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen used it to make noise in Hong Kong. Since Taiwan made it clear that peaceful reunification is not possible, Hong Kong’s role as a model has lost its meaning, and the Chinese central government has gradually started to clean up the problems left behind by policy errors by reformulating a new program for Taiwan. With a new American government showing little inclination to soften the more rigid stance on China established by President Trump, the relationship between China and the United States has deteriorated to the worst level since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Therefore, patience has lost its raison d’être. Given this, it is not surprising that the US has condemned the CPP’s changes in Hong Kong’s internal governance. But other Western governments have joined the United States in their condemnations. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken tweeted that the changes “go against the international commitments of the PRC” and that “we support allies and partners who defend the rights and freedoms of people in Hong Kong”. In a review of political conditions in Hong Kong, the European Union described an “alarming political deterioration” and a “severe erosion of autonomy, democracy and fundamental freedoms”, promising “additional steps” not revealed in response. The nations of the Group of Seven (G7) expressed “grave concerns” about the plan, boldly predicting that “it would stifle political pluralism”. A statement from the Foreign Minister’s office said the United Kingdom would now consider China in a state of continued non-compliance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration that should guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy and rule of law by 2047. “China must act in accordance with its legal obligations and respect fundamental rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, ”said UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. But Beijing simply ignored that command, saying that Hong Kong’s electoral system was China’s internal affair. As the CCP addresses critics of its changes in Hong Kong governance, it does so in a manner consistent with its preference for defensive victim narratives, claiming that these changes were forced into the regime by external and internal threats. At the meeting of the National People’s Congress, Wang Chen, vice-president of the agency, explained that since the “anti-extradition legislative movement” in Hong Kong in 2019, local anti-China forces and radical separatist forces have openly defended “Hong Kong Independence ”and other anti-CCP ideas using electoral platforms, both at the Legislative Council and District Council level. Wang warned that Democrats were seeking (sigh!) To take control of the Legislative Council through elections and take over the He claimed that “foreign forces” had openly interfered in Hong Kong affairs through consular offices, non-governmental organizations and other channels, and that the US had even imposed brutal “sanctions” on Chinese authorities, supporting and openly providing protection for “anti-China forces” in Hong Kong. By further delegitimizing democratic political actors and classifying them as threats, the amendments suggest that more mass arrests of pro-democracy and independence activists who are supposed to be “anti-China and anti-Hong Kong” are taking place. After the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Act last July, there was a debate among the CCP’s elites over whether Beijing would immediately settle the score with the Hong Kong democratic opposition or implement a tactical postponement. Some believed that, in view of the potentially strong reaction against the law and widespread opposition from Western countries, Beijing should evaluate the law’s effectiveness for a period of time before deciding what next step to take, as long as the opposition in Hong Kong it did not cause problems and boycotted the Hong Kong government and the central government. These relatively moderate people felt that most opposition figures should be spared, except for a handful of black hands and leaders as a warning to others. But others believed that Hong Kong’s “anti-extradition legislation” protests shocked Beijing a lot and, as Xi Jinping had already introduced the national security law against Hong Kong, he should liquidate democracy activists one by one. It is now clear that Xi Jinping chose the second option. Shortly after the enactment of the National Security Act, Beijing launched a strong “counter-offensive” against the democratic opposition in Hong Kong. Those who participated in the protests were invariably sought after by the Hong Kong government (unless they fled to Taiwan or the West). On the eve of the Two Sessions, Hong Kong courts filed charges and indicted 47 people in what Beijing dubbed the “China rebellion against China and Hong Kong’s ruin 47 people” case, the biggest trial in eight months since implementation. of the National Security Act. After enacting this law, Xi’s next step in finally giving checkmate to democracy in Hong Kong was to overhaul the Hong Kong electoral mechanism. Chinese academics turned to the state have publicly stated that the executive branch will be firmly in the hands of “patriots”, effectively excluding “anti-China” forces from entering the governance structure. The space for “street politics – demonstration and campaign” to enter the political scene will be limited or even eliminated. Xi’s step-by-step approach to Hong Kong’s subjugation suggests that efforts to further clean up the so-called Hong Kong independence factor and impose “patriotic” cadres in education, the media and sectors of the local community will be next. Your final step will be to demand that this recently “patriotic” Hong Kong government build – that is, buy – political support, narrowing the wealth gap and creating employment and housing opportunities for the younger generation. Beijing is unlikely to publicly announce the abolition of the empty “one country, two systems” model, and will even maintain it after the 50-year transition period has ended. However, the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong and the overhaul of the electoral system have rendered it null and void. Economic integration with the continent and the full political implementation of “patriots ruling Hong Kong” means that there is no difference between Hong Kong and its counterparts in Shenzhen or Shanghai. Beijing does not care whether Hong Kong is a special commercial zone or not. Immune to verbal attacks from the West, the CCP is confident of its power to deal with foreign capitalists and influence policymakers in the West. Its leaders think they have done so successfully in the three decades following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, not only emerging from an unprecedented political crisis, domestically and internationally, but also emerging as a global economic leader. It is unclear how international capital will react to Beijing’s economic policy in Hong Kong and how capital will influence Western policy in Hong Kong. What is clear is that the central government will never stop until the British and American legacy in Hong Kong is eradicated. The dire situation represents an unprecedented challenge for the democratic movement in Hong Kong, as well as for members of the international community who believe that everyone deserves political freedom. Jianli Yang is the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China. Aaron Rhodes is editor of human rights for Dissident magazine and president of the Forum for Religious Freedom in Europe.