So far, Biden seems to be trying to find a balance between these two approaches – one that defends the principles cherished by America while recognizing cold realities, and that exerts both diplomacy and military action. In a region where America’s commitment to its values is regularly subjected to its harshest test, it is trying to forge a painfully nuanced middle way. And although he has achieved that balance so far, it will be extremely difficult to maintain it as new challenges emerge in the region.
The tactical differences between Biden and his predecessors are on display in the new government’s dealings with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
A key goal for Biden is to return to the nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Global Action Plan, which the Obama administration reached in 2015. To move the deal forward, Obama refrained from responding to Iran’s provocations, much to the frustration of critics who accused him. he “appeasement”. Obama made other controversial openings to Iran on the way to an agreement. For example, although he claims that the talks have not prevented him from taking more aggressive action in Syria, an Iranian ally, there are reasons for skepticism.
Even when Trump rejected the Iran deal and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on the Iranian regime, he also ignored several Iranian attacks. He did not respond in 2019, when Iranian allies in Yemen nearly paralyzed Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, or the following year, when Iran-backed forces fired a flurry of missiles at American troops in Iraq. He carried out a crucial operation, killing Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, but there was no coherent deterrent strategy. Many Iranian attacks have been ignored.
This is probably why Iran was taken by surprise last week, when Biden responded to a series of attacks by Iranian militias against American targets in Iraq. The US response – attacking Iranian targets in Syria – has not been unwisely triggered; it was carefully calibrated to avoid problems for the Iraqi government. (Pro-Iranian forces in Iraq often exploit US action to stir against the United States and the Baghdad government.) The Biden government also made a point of discussing the attacks with its allies before the operation. At the same time, the fact that Biden was willing to take military action dispelled fears that, in his eagerness to return to the Obama-era nuclear deal, Biden would turn a blind eye to Iran while his allied fighters wreak havoc.
“The Iranians did not realize that Biden is not Obama,” an Israeli official told Axios with approval.
Saudi Arabia is probably also relieved that Biden is not Obama – even though Riyadh is not yet sure who Biden is. The Saudis could hardly wait for Obama to leave. They felt that he turned to Iran at their expense; he had publicly called them “supposed” allies and said they should “share the neighborhood” with Iran. Then came Trump, who embraced the kingdom, dismissed any human rights concerns and refused to release an intelligence report from the United States. USA (as required by law) which concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was responsible for the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
This is where the Biden needle thread is most visible. While the Trump administration preferred to communicate with MBS, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Biden last week called King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the president’s formal counterpart. Communications with the MBS, which is also a defense minister, have been downgraded; he now speaks to the United States Secretary of Defense. With that, the Biden government basically withdrew recognition of the MBS as a leader in Saudi Arabia, keeping in touch with it.
In the phone call with the king, Biden reaffirmed Washington’s longstanding commitment to Saudi defense, but also highlighted the need for improvements in human rights in Saudi Arabia and a solution to the humanitarian disaster in the Saudi Arabian-led war in Yemen. The next day, Biden released the Khashoggi intelligence report, which officially blamed MBS for the murder. On the one hand, the report recorded a painful mark on the prince for the world to see. At the same time, Biden refused to sanction the MBS, as he did with other Saudi officials involved in the killing. He was rightly criticized for not punishing MBS more severely, but Biden knows that MBS is likely to become king and has chosen not to sacrifice the relationship.
In Israel, Biden again is neither Obama nor Trump. Obama left the Israelis traumatized. On one of his first trips abroad as president, he went to the Middle East, but did not stop in Israel. Instead, he gave a speech in Cairo, where, among other things, he publicly criticized Israeli settlements. Relations declined from there. Trump, meanwhile, gave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a free rein and sided fully with him, transferring the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, supporting Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and looking away when Israel expanded the West Bank settlements. .
Biden will leave the United States Embassy in Jerusalem. But the Israelis are concerned about their plans to re-establish the nuclear deal with Iran, and other differences abound: in a liaison with Netanyahu last month, Biden mentioned the need to promote peace with the Palestinians. He also opposes the expansion of the settlements. However, in his call to Netanyahu, he reaffirmed his personal commitment to Israel’s security. And during the campaign, Biden made it clear that he would deal with disagreements with the Israeli prime minister in particular.
Biden firmly believes in personal relationships as the basis of foreign policy. All signs suggest that he will build on these relationships and continue to try to strike a middle ground. With decades of experience in foreign policy – far more than almost any of his predecessors – he arrives at work with a unique depth of understanding.
Still, threading that needle will not be easy. Biden has signaled that he wants to make the Middle East a lower priority than in the past. However, the region is a tangle of interconnected conflicts, often explosive, with the habit of suddenly demanding urgent attention. Events in the region also tend to attract intense interest from domestic constituents in the United States. This means that Biden’s actions will be closely examined – and criticized – at home.
Sooner or later, Biden will make a decision that will produce an acute reaction. There will come a time when this careful combination of realism and values cannot be sustained. Then, we will see the real test of what the Biden Doctrine is and if it can withstand the realities of the Middle East.