Alliances are the cornerstone of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy agenda. Whether facing China, reducing the coronavirus pandemic or addressing climate change, Biden has repeatedly emphasized the critical importance of working with allies to address major global challenges.
But the problem with keystones is that if they disintegrate, the rest of the structure will fall with them. And, less than a week after Biden’s presidency, the building is starting to shake. That’s because, on a number of important issues, from China to Venezuela for trade, the United States and its closest European allies are out of sync.
Last December, the European Union signed a long-promised investment agreement with China, despite the public concerns of the then new Biden National Security Advisor. Jake Sullivan. The concern now is that China will not only tighten economic relations with the United States’ transatlantic allies, but will also use this newfound access to steal intellectual property from European industries.
This week, the EU as a bloc has downgraded its support for Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan opposition leader. European nations and the United States have considered the country’s interim president since 2019. Now, the EU says Guaidó is a “privileged interlocutor”, potentially exposing a gap in the transatlantic strategy to depose the nation’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro.
Biden also signed on Monday his executive order “Buy America” to ensure that the US government “whenever possible” buys items “that will help American companies compete in strategic sectors and help America’s workers to prosper. Experts fear that European governments will see this move as a continuation of former President Trump’s protectionist economic policies.
Two governments are never in perfect alignment, and there have been differences between the United States and European nations for decades. But the first signs indicate that Biden cannot simply count on European support, which makes getting longtime allies on his side a much higher priority.
“Europeans are not interested in following the US” in whatever they do, said Erik Brattberg, the program director for Europe at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. “Just because Biden is being nice and he’s not Trump, it doesn’t change that calculation.”
US-China investment deal brings headaches for Biden
At the end of 2020, the EU and China closed a long-promised investment agreement. Although details remain scarce, the main thrust of the agreement is that European countries in the bloc will have greater access to the Chinese market and will have their companies treated more fairly in China, while Beijing will make commitments on issues ranging from the use of forced labor. the practice of forcing technology companies to reveal valuable trade secrets to gain access to the Chinese market.
Experts say the deal made sense for the EU. After all, their companies would now have greater access to the largest market in the world, potentially boosting the continent’s economy in the coming decades.
But analysts also note that the cons can outweigh the pros. They suspect that Beijing probably agreed to the deal in order to prevent a transatlantic effort led by Biden to pressure China for its economic and trade practices.
:no_upscale()/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/22261431/1230377766.jpg?w=560&ssl=1)
The new administration seems to agree. Sullivan, Biden’s top national security adviser, expressed his concern about the deal just days before it was finalized. “The Biden-Harris government would welcome early consultations with our European partners about our common concerns about China’s economic practices,” he tweeted on December 21. That statement was not a “don’t do it”, but it was not a clear “we welcome this agreement” either.
Getting the EU to change course will be difficult. It just closed the deal, and the bloc lacks a single agency with which the United States can share information about China’s goals. This means that Biden’s team must go from country to country to explain what they know about Beijing’s true economic goals and the alleged security threats posed by Chinese technology companies.
“In many ways, Trump’s policies were right, but Europeans didn’t like the rhetoric,” said Ryan Tully, who served as senior director for Europe at Trump’s National Security Council. “Now you are seeing the right rhetoric, but I am concerned that there is a setback in the right policies.”
If Biden expected his presence – or Trump’s absence – to automatically mean closer ties between the U.S. and the EU in Chinese politics, he should think again. “Biden’s team needs to recognize that it must involve Europe in creating a joint strategy against China,” Brattberg told me, not just imposing his own strategy on Europe.
The US and the EU see their problem with Venezuela differently
In early 2019, the U.S. assembled a global coalition of more than 50 countries to recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president.
They argued that the May 2018 presidential election was rigged to give Maduro a second six-year term and that, according to Venezuela’s constitution, Guaidó, as head of the National Assembly (the country’s legislative body), was the legitimate – although temporary – leader of the country.
The EU was an important member of that global coalition, but on Monday it downgraded its view of Guaidó’s leadership. The bloc considers him a “privileged interlocutor” now – that is, a key leader with whom the EU will still be involved – but not the country’s interim president.
The reason for the change may be simple: Venezuela just held elections for the National Assembly last year, in which Guaidó and his cohort refused to participate, claiming that the vote was rigged against them. As a result, Guaidó is no longer the head of the legislature and therefore cannot be constitutionally considered the country’s interim president. However, the bloc reiterated “its support for all those who work for a democratic future for Venezuela” in its Tuesday statement.
:no_upscale()/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/22261434/1230090747.jpg?w=560&ssl=1)
Even so, this stance means that the United States and the EU currently view Guaidó differently. During his confirmation hearing to become secretary of state last week, Antony Blinken said the Biden government would still consider Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. (Blinken was confirmed on Tuesday for work.)
What that means for the future of US and EU policy towards Venezuela is unclear. Laura Gamboa, an assistant professor at the University of Utah, said that the divergent view of Guaidó’s status clearly “weakens America’s ability to make the effort appear more multilateral,” even though Washington and Brussels share the same goal of getting Maduro out of power.
But Dorothy Kronick, from the University of Pennsylvania, told me that the EU may have just done Biden a favor. By minimizing the importance of Guaidó, Europeans have given Americans more space to support other democratic groups in Venezuela and not rely solely on Guaidó to depose the dictator. “This EU statement is by no means reversing the commitment to restore democracy in Venezuela,” she said. “It’s about looking for the most successful and effective strategy.”
Still, it is easy to question whether the United States and the EU are on the same page in relation to Venezuela is a problem that the Biden government needs to solve.
Biden’s promise to “buy the American” will irritate Europe
The Obama administration sought to sign a trade agreement with Europe known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which would facilitate the sale of American products in Europe and vice versa. Both sides were unable to reach an agreement, however, and further negotiations died after Trump became president.
Some in Europe may have expected Biden, who was Obama’s number two during the TTIP negotiations, to rekindle pressure for free trade across the Atlantic. Instead, they were left to burn when Biden on Monday signed an executive order “Buy America” to prioritize US federal government purchases of items made in the United States over foreign ones.
The UK-based Financial Times immediately reported that “America’s leading trading partners and strategic allies, including Canada and several European countries, have long complained that US buying measures are a protectionist attempt to exclude their multinationals in the US economy “.
Brattberg, head of the Europe program at the Carnegie Endowment, observed the same thing in our conversation. “Europeans are a little concerned that protectionist policies may continue under Biden,” he told me.
:no_upscale()/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/22261446/1230788926.jpg?w=560&ssl=1)
This can pose a growing problem. Biden’s team promised to pursue a foreign policy that would strengthen the American working class, and ensuring that the government helps American companies to prosper is one way of doing this. But leaning too far towards “Buy American” will only infuriate European allies who have long been hoping to compete loyally in the American market with local companies.
Economic tensions between the US and Europe are already quite high. The Trump administration has placed billions in tariffs on European products, and both the U.S. and the EU recently concluded a grudging trade dispute over subsidies for their major aviation companies. If ever there was a time to calm nerves about the state of transatlantic trade relations, it would be now – and “Buy American” will probably do the opposite.
None of this means that Biden is endangering US-EU relations. It already seems that the continent’s leaders are happier to see him in the Oval Office than Trump. But it is not clear whether Biden has the close bond he hoped to form – which proved to be a major foreign policy problem for his initial presidency.