But Walker says he didn’t get approval until after 5 pm – long after the rebels took over the Capitol, causing lawmakers to flee in search of security. He highlighted then-acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller in particular when describing the slow pace of Sund’s request.
“Consequently, at 5:20 pm (in less than 20 minutes), the District of Columbia National Guard arrived at the Capitol,” Walker wrote. “We helped to re-establish the security perimeter on the east side of the Capitol to facilitate the resumption of the Joint Congressional Session.”
Walker’s testimony adds a new piece to the puzzle of security breaches and communication failures that allowed a violent crowd to ransack the Capitol and delay certification of the results of the 2020 elections. He is the last officer to suggest that military leaders senior officials were partly responsible for tying the hands of security officers on the ground as they struggled to respond to the threat.
Walker also agreed with Capitol security officials that Pentagon leaders gave a lukewarm response to urgent calls for help during a 2:30 pm call on January 6.
“Army leaders did not think it would be good” to send troops to the Capitol and were also concerned about inciting the violent crowd, Walker said.
Acting Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy was not on the call, according to Walker, although others wanted him to be. Walker described this coordination as a stark contrast to the military’s response to civil unrest during the racial justice protests over the summer, when McCarthy was in real-time contact with him to assist law enforcement.
Walker added that if the Pentagon had approved the request earlier, it would have made a significant difference in the security response: “We could have helped to extend the perimeter and push the crowd.”
Walker said the 2:30 pm call included Lieutenant-General Walter Piatt, who was among those concerned with the guard’s perspective at the Capitol, and Lieutenant-General Charles Flynn, who echoed those concerns. Flynn is the brother of former Trump national security adviser, MIchael Flynn – one of the main proponents for canceling the election results.
The three officers charged with protecting lawmakers that day – Sund, ex-weapons sergeant Paul Irving and ex-Senate arms sergeant Michael Stenger – accused the Pentagon of delaying its urgent requests for help from the National Guard. They described a conference call at 2:30 pm on January 6, during which a senior military officer indicated that he was concerned about the “optics” of a heavily armed National Guard force protecting the Capitol and said he would likely urge his superiors to reject his requests. It took several hours for the troops to arrive and help retake the Capitol.
Robert Salesses, a senior Pentagon official who deals with the defense of the country, plans to counter attack Walker’s account when he testifies on Wednesday. In a written statement, Salesses said that Miller approved the “full activation” of the DC National Guard at 3:04 pm. The guards were ordered to leave the Capitol at 4:32 pm, added Salesses.
Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also supporting the Pentagon’s version of events. He told reporters on Tuesday that the Pentagon reacted at “fast speed” to the request for help from Congress. The deployment of a large force of guard troops in a few hours is extremely rapid in military terms, he emphasized.
Walker’s account is the executive branch’s first official testimony in its response to the Capitol’s request for help. Other intelligence officers charged with informing law enforcement partners about imminent threats are also expected to testify in the Senate on Wednesday.
They include Melissa Smislova, a senior Homeland Security official in charge of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; Jill Sanborn, who heads the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and Robert Salesses, the Pentagon’s chief officer responsible for national defense and global security.
Sund and other Capitol security officials said the intelligence warnings they received in the days leading up to the January 6 attack did not support the need to align a significant National Guard presence.
Instead, they said, available intelligence suggested that the volume of protesters would look like the turnout in November and December, when the pro-Trump rallies generated spasms of violence, but ended up being contained. Never, said former Capitol security officials, had they predicted an organized and coordinated attack on the legislative branch that would overwhelm the 1,200 police on the scene and result in a violation of the building.
Rather than seeking a robust National Guard presence in advance, former Capitol security officials said they asked Walker to simply be ready in case they needed him. Walker, they said, offered to place 125 National Guard units in support functions, such as a transit service, to help free the Capitol Police for more direct combat with the protesters.
One of the sharpest points of disagreement between the three Capitol officials – all of whom resigned after the insurrection – is the timing of their requests for help from the National Guard, since it was clear that the Capitol would be invaded. Sund, whose account was supported by Capitol Police Chief Yogananda Pittman, said he contacted Irving around 1:00 pm on January 6 to ask for permission to request assistance from the National Guard.
But Irving says he didn’t hear from Sund until 1:28 pm and didn’t receive a formal request for assistance from the National Guard until after 2 pm, when Sund arrived at Irving and Stenger together. The hour-long gap in officers’ memories has fueled an ongoing dispute as Congress begins its investigation into the security response to the insurrection.
The intelligence assessment that prompted Capitol security officials to reject the need for preventive support from the National Guard is also at issue. An FBI intelligence assessment sent on January 5 by the bureau’s Norfolk Field Office, which described those descending on DC as prepared for “war,” never reached senior officials. And even if it did, they said, the information was largely taken from social media and was “raw” and “unverified”.
However, the acting chief of police for Sund, Pittman and Washington DC, Robert Contee III, said the agency had not sounded a significant alarm about the intelligence that could have brought it to his attention.
FBI director Christopher Wray offered his agency’s schedule of events on Tuesday. Wray agreed that intelligence was “not corroborated” and said he emphasizes the challenge for investigators looking to separate social media hyperbole from actionable information.
Sanborn added additional details on the FBI’s response to the January 6 attack, telling lawmakers that FBI tactical teams helped respond to reports of explosive devices placed near the Republican and Democratic Party headquarters that day.
“One of the FBI tactical teams coordinated with the U.S. Capitol Police and the US Secret Service to provide additional protection to a US Secret Service protégé still in the building,” said Sanborn, adding that “other FBI Special Agents have provided perimeter security around the US Capitol and the areas where explosive devices were found. “
The hearing on Wednesday came as Sund’s successor in charge of the Capitol Police, Pittman, asked lawmakers for a $ 70 million increase in his department’s budget to respond to the gaps revealed by the insurrection. She said she is seeking funds to revamp the department’s intelligence-sharing technology and to address the growing threats against lawmakers, which rose by more than 93 percent last year.
Pittman also described significant resources being offered to police officers affected by the January 6 attack, including counseling for them and their families, hotel stays and hot meals.