Former IDF chief intelligence analyst: we know almost everything about Nasrallah

The IDF knows almost everything about Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, but can still be reprized for an unwanted escalation with him, said former IDF intelligence chief Brigadier-General (retired) Itai Brun The Jerusalem Post on Monday.

Brun was reacting to a combination of something unusual Yediot Aharonot story on Friday in which current officials, many of whom served under his 2011-2015 command, revealed aspects of his confidential assessment of Nasrallah along with the Hezbollah chief’s rejection of the allegations in that article.

“The IDF knows a lot about Nasrallah. Nasrallah knows this and knows a lot about Israel, but there may still be a different escalation of how he usually acts, ”said Brun, referring to the idea that leaders can act unpredictably even after a period in which they follow a consistent pattern .

He said that the IDF intelligence message through the article appeared to be: “We know everything – you are exposed. Your organization is exposed. We have superior information. “

In addition, Brun, who is currently deputy director of Research and Analysis at INSS, said that IDF intelligence could be using the article to respond to this latest series of exchanges.

Describing how in January, the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General. Aviv Kochavi threatened Nasrallah to try to prevent him from any escalation and counter-threat from the Hezbollah chief that he has surprises for Jerusalem in the event of a war that could shock Israelis, Brun said that this could be the IDF’s response: “ you can’t surprise us. “

The article describes Nasrallah as obsessed with reading Israeli media coverage, with his image in Israel and Lebanon in general, and maintaining extraordinary levels of micromanagement and control of the Lebanese state.

In addition, the IDF intelligence officers in the article give the impression that they have an enormous penetration and vision of Nasrallah’s inner circle, method of operations and intentions.

In that sense, intelligence officials suggest that Nasrallah is very deterred and intimidated from any widespread conflict with Israel and far more conservative in placing bets than before in his 28-year reign over the Lebanese terrorist group.

Brun, who probably formulated significant parts of the confidential file during his service, confirmed that Nasrallah, “is very interested in the Israeli public, the government, the IDF and what they say about him”, as well as his “obsessive reading of everything we write and stories about him having Israeli newspapers close to him. ”

However, he said that “Nasrallah’s main knowledge does not come from reading, but from Hezbollah’s conflict with us over 28 years.”

At this point, Brun pointed out gaps in Nasrallah’s knowledge and where Israeli estimates could also be imperfect, despite the impressive penetration of intelligence.

After conflicts with Israel in 1993, 1996, 2000, an exchange of attacks in 2003 and a hijacking attack in late 2005, the Hezbollah chief thought he could continue small hijacking attack operations without risking a major fight with Jerusalem.

Brun said Nasrallah “was really surprised, he didn’t understand the Israeli side” that led to the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and others replaced Ariel Sharon and those who ruled the country for about five years .

In other words, Nasrallah did not intend the great war of 2006 and that war combined with his success in converting Hezbollah’s military power into yet another army, social network and dominant political apparatus, changed his attitude towards Israel.

The former senior military intelligence officer said he calls the current version of Nasrallah “Nasrallah 4.0”.

Like the current IDF intelligence officers cited in the Yediot article, he said that the Hezbollah leader is now “an advocate for the status quo. He drew the rules of the game [in Lebanon], so now he doesn’t want the rules to be broken. “

He added that Nasrallah “became a more careful, cautious and deliberate actor” before making significant moves towards Israel.

In addition, Brun confirmed that Nasrallah “is overloaded and spread” when trying to deal with all the different levers of power after his main military planner, Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in 2008, allegedly by Israel and the United States.

Another major development he discussed was that Hezbollah now “mainly serves the interests of the organization, thinks of its own people and institutions”, rather than just “a representative of Iran”.

All this while maintaining the pillars of his power and success in Lebanon are the same reasons why the “description of the current IDF intelligence is correct – today he is more hesitant, less ready to take risks, more restrained.”

But Brun signaled Nasrallah’s attack on an IDF convoy in the North in September 2019, when he did not know that Israeli soldiers would avoid being killed, as a sign that “he was ready for an escalation when it is important enough, although perhaps not for a climb out of control. ”

According to the former intelligence officer, this means that the IDF cannot be complacent and feel confident that there is no scenario in which Hezbollah will not overthrow Israel with its rocket arsenal.

He argued that a deep understanding of a leader’s past habits is good, but it is just that – his past habits – and it is not a perfect indicator of his future conduct.

“I think it is not right to learn from this that we know exactly what Nasrallah will do … leaders do not have operational codes,” which perfectly predict when they can act against their usual pattern.

Brun listed a number of examples of leaders and countries acting unpredictably, including Anwar Sadat, Mikhail Gorbachev, Barack Obama and Donald Trump.

He said that although he did not necessarily participate in an article on sharing confidential information during his service at IDF, he had attended conferences and that “the world has changed. There is logic in doing this with due care. Many things today are revealed publicly. “

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