The New York Times
The lost hours: how confusion and inaction on Capitol Hill delayed the deployment of a troop
WASHINGTON – At 1:09 pm on January 6, minutes after protesters broke through the barricades around the United States Capitol and began using steel wreckage to attack guard officers, the Capitol Police chief made a desperate request reinforcement. It took almost two hours for officials to approve the deployment of the National Guard. New details about what happened over those 115 minutes on that dark and violent day – revealed in interviews and documents – tell the story of how chaotic decision-making between political and military leaders consumed precious time as the Capitol riots got out of hand . Communication failures, inaction and confusion over who had the authority to call the National Guard delayed the sending of hundreds of soldiers who could have helped to suppress the hours-long violence. Subscribe to the New York Times newsletter The Morning This period is likely to be the focus of a Congressional hearing on Tuesday, when lawmakers will publicly question Steven A. Sund, the Capitol Police chief at the time, and other current officials and former employees of the first time about the security breaches that contributed to the violence that day. “Capitol security leaders must address the decision not to approve the National Guard’s request, failures in agency coordination and information sharing, and how the threat intelligence they had before January 6 informed their security decisions. until that day, ”said the senator. Maggie Hassan, DN.H. Some American officials said that by the time the urgent request reached the Pentagon on the afternoon of January 6, it had been a long time since National Guard troops could have deployed quickly enough to prevent the attack on the Capitol. But the police pointed out that during a confusion that lasted for hours, every minute lost was critical. Sund had no response for 61 minutes after asking the National Guard for help. And yet, there was a problem: while Capitol security officials approved his request, the Pentagon had the final say. During a tense phone call that started 18 minutes later, a general said he did not like the look of the military guarding the Capitol and that he would recommend the Army Secretary to deny the request. Pentagon approval finally arrived at 3:04 pm. The first deployment of National Guard troops arrived at the Capitol two and a half hours later. Video evidence and interviews show that the Capitol Police and police support units were overwhelmed for several hours after the first members of the pro-Trump mob breached the complex’s outer perimeter. A snapshot of the violence: at 4:25 pm, protesters outside the Capitol building beat up police officers using American flags. Two minutes later, a crowd outside the town hall dragged the first of two Metropolitan Police officers from the city down a flight of stairs. Elsewhere, on Capitol grounds, a demonstrator who collapsed in the crush of bodies was trampled underfoot by the crowd. She was later declared dead. “In every emergency, time is important. In this particular case, when we’re talking about Capitol, we’re talking about lives, ”said Brian Higgins, the former police chief for Bergen County, New Jersey, and an adjunct professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Sund made the National Guard’s urgent request to Paul D. Irving, the House’s arms sergeant at the time, minutes after the hammer fell to begin Congress’ solemn ritual of certifying the results of the presidential election. At that point, shortly after 1 pm, it became clear to some Capitol security officials that the protesters could pose a threat to lawmakers – and Vice President Mike Pence – meeting in the Chamber of Deputies. But Irving said he needed to make Sund’s request for National Guard troops “go up the chain of command,” according to a letter the former police chief wrote to Congress this month. Sund said he was looking forward to a response from Irving or Michael C. Stenger, the Senate arms sergeant, but he heard nothing. “I continued to follow Mr. Irving, who was with Mr. Stenger at the time, and he warned that he was waiting for a response from Congressional leadership, but expected authorization at any time,” said Sund in his letter. However, it appears that Irving, who had told Sund days before that he did not want National Guard troops at the Capitol on January 6 because of poor “optics”, waited 30 minutes after hearing the Capitol Police chief before approaching the team of spokeswoman Nancy Pelosi. Neither Irving nor Stenger, who resigned after the riot, responded to several requests for an interview. Sund resigned on January 7, after pressure from Congressional leaders. At 1:40 pm, Irving finally approached Pelosi’s chief of staff, Terri McCullough, and other staff members in the speaker’s lobby behind the Chamber of Deputies – the place where a Capitol policeman would shoot a rowdy man an hour later. It was the first time that Irving asked permission to seek support from the National Guard, according to Drew Hammill, Pelosi’s deputy chief of staff. McCullough immediately entered the room and passed a note to Pelosi with the request. Video from inside the camera shows her approaching the speaker at 1:43 pm. Pelosi approved the request and asked whether Senator Mitch McConnell, the Kentucky Republican who was then the majority leader, also needed to approve it. McCullough said yes, according to Pelosi’s office. McCullough left the camera to call McConnell’s chief of staff, Sharon Soderstrom, but was unable to locate her. She then contacted Irving, who explained that he and Stenger were already meeting with the Senate majority leader team at the Senate Arms Sergeant’s office, according to Pelosi’s office. It was at the meeting in Stenger’s office that McConnell’s team learned of Sund’s request for the National Guard, according to a spokesman for the senator. At that meeting, advisers to congressional leaders, including Soderstrom, were perplexed to learn that the two arms sergeants had not yet approved the troop request, according to spokesmen for McConnell and Pelosi. There was also confusion over whether approval by Congressional leaders was needed to request National Guard troops. McConnell’s team says that political leaders are not in that chain of command and that security officials should have done this as soon as possible. A former Capitol security officer said the two arms sergeants could have made the request themselves, but that, even in an emergency, “common sense dictates” that they should consult with Congressional leadership. At that meeting, frustrated congressional advisers agreed that the Capitol’s top security officials “should have asked for the physical deployment of the National Guard to protect the United States Capitol complex well before January 6,” said Hammill. “The speaker expects security professionals to make security decisions and be informed of those decisions.” Around that time, the troublemakers broke the windows on the side of the House of the Capitol building and started to enter. Outside, the crowd started shouting “Hang Mike Pence!” Others built a noose with a noose outside the Capitol. At 2:10 pm, Irving finally called Sund and said that Congressional leaders had approved the request – an entire hour after his request for help. But the Capitol Police Chief would soon learn, according to his letter, that, like Washington, DC, is not a state, the final approval to send the city’s National Guard to the Capitol had to come from the Secretary of the Army. It is not clear why Sund was not familiar with this requirement. There was another obstacle: the Pentagon, citing concerns about aggressive tactics used against protesters over the summer, withdrew the authority of Major General William J. Walker, commander of the District of Columbia National Guard, to rapidly deploy its troops. In a January 4 memo, acting Defense Secretary Christopher C. Miller wrote that the DC National Guard could not receive weapons, employ “riot control agents” or take other measures at Trump’s rally without his “personal authorization”. During a closed-door hearing on the House committee last month, Walker said Sund had called him when the violence escalated that day, and he immediately notified the army. “On my own, I started preparing people to get ready, but I had to wait for specific approval to leave for the launch,” testified Walker, according to several people who attended the meeting. At around 2:30 pm, according to Sund’s letter, he was on a conference call with local and federal police and military officials. Again, he said National Guard troops are urgently needed to protect the Capitol. Lieutenant-General Walter E. Piatt, the Army’s chief of staff, stepped back. “I don’t like the image of the National Guard on a line with the Capitol in the background,” Piatt said in the call, according to Sund’s account. The general said he would inform the army secretary, but would recommend denying the request. An army spokesman declined to comment on Sund’s description of the call, noting that the Pentagon’s inspector general was investigating his response to the attack. While Pentagon leaders deliberated, the crowd flowed to the Capitol. At 2:44 pm, the first demonstrators invaded the Senate chamber. At the same time, a Capitol Police officer shot Ashli Babbitt, one of the protesters, while she tried to climb a window a few steps from the town hall. Twenty minutes later, according to the Pentagon’s schedule, Miller gave verbal approval to send National Guard troops to the Capitol. The violence continued for hours, and other security units from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the Metropolitan Police arrived to help unmanned police units. At about 5:40 pm, a detachment of 154 National Guard soldiers arrived at the Capitol. During the oath, an instant message was sent to all Washington National Guard troops: Report to the city’s arsenal before 7:00 pm. This article was originally published in The New York Times. © 2021 The New York Times Company