The change in orientation, according to DC National Guard Commander General William Walker, was communicated in a January 5 memorandum that stated that he should seek approval from the Secretary of the Army and Defense before preparing troops to respond to a civil disturbance.
“It was necessary to seek authorization from the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense to essentially protect my guards,” he told senators during a hearing on security breaches related to the attack on the Capitol building.
“Therefore, no civil disturbance equipment could be authorized unless it came from the Secretary of Defense … the Secretary of Defense told me that I needed his permission to climb in order to have that kind of protection,” added Walker, calling the January 5th. “unusual” memo.
Asked about the Army’s response to the request by former US Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund for additional forces, Walker said he was “stunned”.
“I was frustrated. I was just as surprised as everyone else on the conference call,” he said.
Walker also testified that it took Army leaders more than three hours to authorize the use of troops to help contain the January 6 uprising, suggesting that response times were well below “sprint speed”, as characterized by the officer US military.
Walker told lawmakers that around 1:49 pm on January 6, he received a “frantic call from” Sund, whose voice was choked with emotion, indicating that there was a terrible emergency on Capitol Hill and he asked for immediate help from all those available National guards that I could gather. “
‘They had the equipment’
Asked how he would have responded to the call if the additional DoD restrictions had not been enforced, Walker said he would have “immediately removed all guards supporting the Metropolitan Police Department”.
“They had the equipment and the vehicles.” Walker said. “I would have made them gather in the arsenal and then get on the bus and go straight to the arsenal and report to the most senior Capitol police officer they saw and take the direction, and beyond.”
Walker testified that he could have sent 155 guards to the Capitol shortly after 2 pm, but he did not do so without approval, adding that he eagerly loaded the guards on the buses to place his equipment and waited.
But unlike Milley, who said the Pentagon acted quickly to mobilize National Guard troops as soon as he received a request for additional aid on January 6, Walker indicated that he thought the authorization process should have taken less time and said that about 150 soldiers were ready to be deployed to the Capitol hours before they finally received the green light.
“Approval for Chief Sund’s request would eventually come from the acting defense secretary and would be relayed to me by senior army leaders at 5:08 pm – 3 hours and 19 minutes later,” Walker said on Wednesday in his prepared statement.
“We already had guards on the buses ready to move to the Capitol. Consequently, at 17:20 (in less than 20 minutes), the District of Columbia National Guard arrived at the Capitol, ”added Walker.
But Walker’s timeline came into conflict with the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Defense for Homeland Security, Robert Salesses, who said on Wednesday that the entire DC National Guard was activated within an hour, highlighting the differences – even between the Department of Defense and the National Guard – on how quickly the Pentagon responded to the riots.
Former Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy instructed the DC National Guard to begin full mobilization. The approval of acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller came at 4:32 pm, added Salesses, and McCarthy then ordered the Guard to leave Arsenal and go to the Capitol.
Capitol police and officers pointed the finger at the Pentagon
During last week’s hearings, the former Capitol Police chief, as well as the former House and Senate arms sergeant, all of whom resigned after the riot, accused law enforcement agencies of proving bad intelligence and blamed it the Department of Defense for not responding quickly enough to their requests for help.
But military leaders say there was no delay and that it took a long time to clarify and organize a response to what they say is a vague but urgent request for help from city officials and the Capitol Police.
“This is the DC National Guard who started a cold game and they had troops there in two and a half hours, three hours,” Milley told reporters who were traveling with him on Monday during a visit to Colorado, according to with the Post. “They reacted faster than our elite forces from a cold start.”
In talks over the past few weeks, defense officials reiterated that the National Guard is not a first-response unit capable of sending armed troops into a hostile situation with minimal planning. There is also a sense of frustration and annoyance among some former officers that the Capitol Police and others in Washington, DC, expected guards to appear instantly.
“The Army cannot mobilize guards or plan contingencies without solicitation,” said former Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy in late January.
Pentagon officials repeatedly offered more national guards before January 6 and were refused, including the day before the riot. Meanwhile, some Defense Department officials wonder why the Secret Service and Park Police did not sound the alarm early in the day of the rebellion, when they witnessed a large crowd gathering and walking towards the Capitol.
Last week, the ex-Senate weapons sergeant, the ex-weapons sergeant in the House and Sund said they needed help from the National Guard. But the three, although united in blaming the Pentagon for delaying aid, disagreed when they knew they needed that help and seemed unaware of the process or chain of command to request and activate the National Guard.
Sund said he first signaled the need for more help on January 4, two days before the riot. But former House Sergeant Paul Irving said he did not interpret Sund’s call as a request, and that Sund, Irving and former Senate Arms Sergeant Michael Stenger agreed that intelligence does not support calling for more troops. .
The final decision was to mobilize 340 DC National Guard soldiers, along with a 40-person rapid-response force and a team of hazardous biological chemicals. The guards had a specific task, agreed between the Pentagon, Washington officials and others, to help with traffic control.
This story has been updated with further developments.