All the presidents of the United States in the past 30 years have entered the White House thinking that it is they who will finally solve North Korea’s nuclear problem. And, without fail, all US presidents during that same period left office with the most deeply rooted problem. The trend is likely to continue if President Joe Biden does not endorse a dramatic break from conventional orthodoxy.
Many of the Biden government’s top foreign policy officials have first-hand experience dealing with North Korea’s archive of their previous government stint. The White House has already announced that a review of North Korea’s policy will be launched soon.
No review, however, will result in an effective American policy if President Biden is unwilling to challenge certain assumptions about North Korea – all taken for granted in Washington, but also proven to be wrong over time.
The first assumption is the most widespread: under no circumstances can the United States tolerate a North Korea with nuclear weapons. According to this logic, to allow North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to possess nuclear warheads is to mock the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and tolerate a situation in which the United States and its allies are less secure.
However prevalent this assumption may be, it is wrong on the merits and far behind. The United States and its allies in Asia are living in the world as it exists, not in the world that we want it to be. North Korea is a state with nuclear weapons.
The US Army estimates that Pyongyang has about 20-60 nuclear warheads in its arsenal. That work did not stop just because former President Donald Trump decided to embark on summit diplomacy with the North. The simple fact is that Washington’s established tradition of pursuing the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea is an outdated objective that has been outdated by current events. Although the Biden government does not have to give up denuclearization as a long-term goal, the preface to the resumption of bilateral negotiations with the North over such a far-reaching demand will certainly poison the well and force Pyongyang to avoid dialogue altogether.
The second assumption is as useless and potentially damaging as the first: that Kim Jong-un, like his father, is an irrational human being who is just one night’s sleep away from using his nuclear warheads against the United States or his allies in the East Asian. The Kim-is-crazy hypothesis has led to some extraordinarily stupid political pronouncements by U.S. lawmakers, like Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina’s recommendation that the US may need to go to war with a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. to prevent Pyongyang from hitting California with a nuclear-powered intercontinental ballistic missile.
Kim Jong-un, however, is not a lunatic determined to destroy. In fact, he is the leader of an extremely weak and vulnerable country surrounded by exponentially more powerful neighbors than his own, with a historically hostile relationship with the main military, diplomatic and economic power in the world.
In such a situation, a nuclear arsenal is the best life insurance policy that a weak state can buy to prevent stronger rivals from considering military action. These decisions do not reflect a madman, but a rational and cold-blooded leader holding a bad set of cards. As a leading CIA analyst responsible for North Korea concluded: “He [Kim] he wants to rule for a long time and die peacefully in his own bed. “
In other words, Kim Jong-un responds to deterrence like any other national leader. And there is no doubt that the United States, with militaries infinitely stronger than those in Pyongyang, can stop the regime for as long as necessary.
Last but not least, there is a universal theory in Washington’s political circles that the weaker the North Korean economy, the more likely it is that Pyongyang is willing to compromise on its nuclear deterrent. This belief appears to have credibility among some of Biden’s national security advisers; during his confirmation hearing on January 19, the new Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that other pressure options in the North will be evaluated.
History, however, has shown that this is not a particularly good idea. If there was ever a time when North Koreans would be eager to start denuclearization negotiations, it would be today, when the Kim regime is experiencing significant financial difficulties due to a combination of floods, trade restrictions and coronavirus-related border closures. Exports to China, North Korea’s salvation, fell 74% year on year.
So far, none of this economic turmoil is convincing North Koreans to enter into new negotiations on Washington terms. In any case, maximum pressure on the North is likely to persuade Kim Jong-un to continue developing new strategic weapon systems in order to strengthen his defenses and acquire more bargaining power should diplomacy return. As Sydney Seiler, the US national intelligence officer for North Korea, said on January 23, “when [North Korea is] hurting, when you need help ”,“ you are less likely to get involved because you feel vulnerable ”.
One thing is certain about this policy review: if President Biden does not reevaluate the decaying assumptions that Washington has relied on, his own policy on North Korea is likely to be as unproductive as that of his predecessors.
Daniel R. DePetris is a member of Defense Priorities.