Beijing sent the largest incursion of Chinese jets into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone last Friday, prompting the country’s defense ministry to announce that it would no longer board its own planes in response.
These flights through Taiwan’s ADIZ are now essentially a regular occurrence, and they feature in a broader Chinese “gray zone” campaign against the country that included everything from banning pineapple imports to inflicting economic problems on shipping a fleet of civilian dredging ships to erode the coasts of the outlying islands of Taiwan. Shuffling their own jets to intercept the People’s Liberation Army planes only drained precious resources at a precarious time, so Taipei will instead train its missile systems on the PLA jets each time an incursion occurs.
US defense planners warn that Beijing is making room for an attack – which could occur in the not-too-distant future.
At two separate Senate hearings last month, the current head of the United States’ Indo-Pacific Command and the one appointed to replace him warned of the growing threat of a Chinese attack. It could happen “in the next decade, indeed in the next six years,” said Admiral Phil Davidson. His alleged successor, Admiral John Aquilino, made a similar assessment a few weeks later: “There are periods from today to 2045. My opinion is that this problem is much closer to us than many think”.
His grim assessments are corroborated by the facts.
First, consider the extent of the growth of the Chinese armed forces in recent decades. Not only has the People’s Liberation Army embarked on a massive modernization movement in the past 30 years, but these efforts have been supported by an extensive initiative across the country to gather precisely the kind of resources needed for an eventual cross-strait invasion. Even one of China’s largest ferry operators built ships according to PLA specifications that could transport equipment and personnel during an amphibious attack.
And, crucially, this build-up focused on blunting US deterrence through the development of anti-access / area denial capabilities that would impose significant costs on U.S. forces that came to Taiwan’s defense. These are the types of weapons that can sink American ships, neutralize critical battlefield surveillance systems and threaten more distant bases.
The modernization movement has been so successful that in the Pentagon war games, the United States always loses to China in hypothetical conflicts over Taiwan.
Behind the Chinese impulse for a military advantage is a relentless national determination. The “reunification” of the island with the mainland has long been considered a central interest of the party-state and a question of the regime’s survival. American officials believe that Xi Jinping considers reunification to be the key to consolidating his government.
When Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen of the Progressive Democratic Party as its independent mindset, the continent cut off all diplomatic and cooperative channels and stepped up its coercion efforts, leading to today’s gray zone campaign. In the event of an invasion, the CCP could employ other irregular tactics, such as cyber attacks and disinformation operations, isolating the island from the rest of the world.
This would directly imply US interests. A successfully executed invasion would destroy the US posture in the Pacific, potentially driving US allies into Beijing’s orbit. All of America’s bases in the region would be highly vulnerable to attack, and the success of the invasion of Taiwan would justify the CCP’s thesis of a declining West, encouraging it to seek additional gains. A communist takeover could spell the beginning of an order led by the Chinese in East Asia, and perhaps beyond.
To avoid carrying out this nightmare, Congress must work with the Pentagon to fully fund defense modernization efforts and to review the United States’ defense capabilities in the Pacific. This should include, as Admiral Aquilino argued, the Billion Dollar Pacific Deterrence Initiative, aimed at financing new weapons and technologies needed to combat Chinese capabilities. The only way to stop a direct military confrontation is to convince the Chinese that success is almost impossible. Beijing knows that the United States can impose high costs on the PLA, but if it sees a possibility of success, it is likely to act anyway.
The Biden government, while continuing to develop the Trump administration’s work to strengthen ties with Taiwan, must work with America’s allies on defense agreements for Taiwan-related contingencies. Such a pact with Australia was recently revealed, and the Japanese government also cemented an agreement directly with Taipei. There are still things to be done.
The assumption that guides these efforts and inspires a sense of urgency must be that Beijing could start its attack almost at any time.