BRUSSELS – When Joseph R. Biden Jr. stepped down as vice president four years ago, concern about nuclear weapons was low, except in North Korea. But after four years of Donald J. Trump, President Biden has returned to a world fraught with nuclear dangers.
There is little gun control; modern technologies are unrestricted; and players are more numerous and build up nuclear stocks quickly. Just as important, Trump’s transactional, spasmodic and America’s First policies undermined the allies’ confidence in American security guarantees.
Many experts are now warning that Biden must once again make gun control a priority, even though the notion seems as dated as the 1970s and 80s wide lapel suits, when complex treatises on “throwing weights” and “fire” multiple entry vehicles ”dominated Cold War diplomacy.
Failure to do so, they say, risks accelerating a nuclear arms race, with new threats to American allies in the Middle East, Europe and Asia.
But few want to discuss the dangers, especially in Europe, where nuclear literacy is over and the danger comes from short-range nuclear weapons discovered by any weapon control.
For Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute of International Affairs in Italy, the lack of debate is shocking. “We barely discussed nuclear,” she said. “On the risk and threat side, there is not enough understanding of how much more dangerous it is becoming.”
The most immediate solution would be to restore American credibility, experts say, although even that is not easy. The old guarantee that the United States would respond with its own arsenal if the allies were attacked was a strong barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. Not anymore, maybe.
America’s partners in Europe and Asia feel vulnerable. They want assurances that the United States’ security guarantees are valid, realistic and reliable, experts say. Otherwise, some would consider becoming nuclear, either openly or secretly.
Just before the last nuclear weapons control treaty with Russia, the New START, expired, Biden extended for another five years. But it does nothing to lessen the threat of more modern technologies, tactical or medium-range nuclear missiles, or other nuclear nations.
All other nuclear weapons control treaties, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, lapsed and Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which imposed strict limits on Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium.
“The combination of these challenges increases the nuclear security of our allies again, as they ask whether they can continue to rely on the United States as they have always done,” said Ivo Daalder, former US ambassador to NATO and chairman of the Global Affairs Council of Chicago.
“Some allies are questioning the feasibility and credibility of the US nuclear and security guarantee,” he said.
Doubts about America’s security guarantees are not new, but they are greater than ever. Charles de Gaulle, who as French president created his country’s independent nuclear deterrent in the 1960s, questioned the American willingness to exchange “New York for Paris” and, in 2018, Trump wondered if the United States should go to war for defend Montenegro, a NATO member state.
Given North Korea’s new reach and capability, with missiles that could hit the United States, Daalder said, Asian allies are asking, “Are you going to sacrifice us for you? Will you save Seattle at the price of Seoul? “
Without US nuclear weapons there, reassuring Asia is very difficult.
“Biden’s nuclear agenda so far has not received the global attention it deserves, especially in relation to the modernization of Asia and China,” said Kevin Rudd, the former Prime Minister of Australia who is president of the Asia Society.
“There needs to be enough belief in the collective deterrence and the American nuclear umbrella to prevent the Allies from contemplating their own national nuclear escapes,” he said.
The problem of confidence that Biden faces is military and political, said Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. There is a growing threat from nuclear opponents and less gun control, he said, and there are doubts about America’s willingness to act.
America’s nuclear guarantee “was the one that suffered most from Trump’s transactional approach to alliances,” he said. “If I were an American ally, I would have to think twice about how much I could count on the United States guarantee, since this American isolationism and unilateralism is not going away.”
Mr. Daalder brought together 16 former employees and analysts to write a report on these issues.
Among its recommendations are suggestions for “rebalancing the transatlantic partnership”, encouraging Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and security.
Europeans should fund “real military capabilities” instead of managing and modernizing NATO’s nuclear assets, the report says. Controversial, she recommends that France and Britain join in extending their nuclear barriers to cover European allies.
The report also calls on Washington to resume serious security cooperation with Japan and South Korea and to create an Asian nuclear planning group, including Australia, to bring allies for American nuclear strategy into the region.
If Europe is also vulnerable, anxiety is especially acute in Asia.
“Both South Korea and Japan are under threat from this growing North Korean nuclear arsenal and missile capability,” said Byung-se Yun, a former South Korean foreign minister. “Both countries feel that the current level of extended deterrence is not sufficient to protect us. Nuclear safety has become the most important issue for America in Asia. “
Asians fear that Washington will make a deal with North Korea on intercontinental missiles, but not on shorter-range missiles, which may begin to separate American and South Korean interests.
In opinion polls, a consistent majority of South Koreans support the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and center and conservative political parties have asked Washington to install nuclear weapons in the country.
Japan is also vulnerable, but is allergic to debating nuclear strategy after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, said Nobuyasu Abe, former commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission and former UN under-secretary-general for disarmament.
North Korea does not yet have a second strike capability, he said, but “we can be too confident”.
China, rapidly increasing its military budget and nuclear stockpile, is a different matter. “What is happening to us is China,” said Abe. “It is a large dragon, but its tail is too short to be seen by Europeans.”
The risk is Taiwan, he said, and how to defend it or prevent China from attacking it.
The American policy of “strategic ambiguity” is out of date, he said, “when Xi Jinping is so explicit in Taiwan”.
The United States is 10,000 kilometers away, said Abe. “So, convince us that you can stop the Chinese. Are you ready to use nuclear weapons to stop China? Washington never said yes. “
An aggressive Russia poses similar problems for Europe and especially Germany, with its own nuclear allergy, said Wolfgang Ischinger, president of the Munich Security Conference.
The issue is so sensitive that “during the 16 years of Angela Merkel’s chancellery, we didn’t have a significant discussion about deterrence, which means, we need it, why and the substance of NATO policy,” he said.
The loss of public confidence in the United States after the Trump years, especially in Germany, is vivid in the opinion polls of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
But French ideas about European “strategic autonomy” are risky, Ischinger said. “NATO is so important to our security that we must avoid sending signals that we are considering alternatives.”
Radoslaw Sikorski, a European legislator and former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, sees danger in Russia’s new weapons, especially without the treaty of forces of intermediate scope.
“What is surprising is that this did not cause a reaction in the capitals that entered the range, such as Berlin,” he said. “There is nothing like the discussion and reaction produced by a similar movement by the Soviets in the mid-1980s, when millions protested and governments were overthrown.”
As Fitzpatrick notes, “Vulnerability does not matter if you believe and trust US security guarantees, because the United States has things on the horizon that can reach targets in 30 minutes.”
But this, he and others say, is a growing “if”.