As part of a national review, the police inspection identified and outlined a number of concerns in a “hot interrogation” with an assistant police chief in November 2016.
He concluded that there was a risk that a force service officer would be overwhelmed in the event that a looting firearm attack was declared, which police experts consider to have happened on the night of the bombing in May 2017, as the ambulance and fire and rescue services were not informed in advance.
Such an attack would lead to the designation of a hot zone to which only properly trained firearms officers can go and decide when emergency services can assist victims. At the time, such an event was called Operation Plato.
The investigation heard that only one paramedic was in the City Room foyer, where Salman Abedi detonated his bomb, killing 22 people, in the first 40 minutes after the explosion. The first fire engine arrived more than two hours after the explosion.
Andrew Buchan, associate inspector at Her Majesty’s Police and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), gave testimony on Monday and said he found that although GMP’s Plato plan was “very tactically focused”, he did not enter in detail on how to work with other agencies.
He told the lawyer for the investigation that Paul Greaney QC had placed an “overconfidence” on the force service officer (FDO) to lead his response to a terrorist attack.
The inspection report noted that “the number of tasks that the FDO is expected to perform in all likelihood is such that some may not be completed or at least in the expected order,” the survey heard.
The GMP acknowledged that the pressures under which the FDO would be placed “would bring its own challenges”, but left the matter unresolved, the report said.
“This apparent inaccuracy can cause confusion or doubt in a live setting,” he added.
“It is necessary to provide the FDO with more immediate support or resources to assist in all functions expected from that function.”
The report concluded: “There is no doubt that the FDO is being overwhelmed with tasks in the early stages of a potential Plato and will need urgent help.”
The inspection also concluded that the GMP could do more to increase the level of understanding of its terrorism response plan among its unarmed police and control room personnel. He also conducted focus group interviews with GMP officials and found that none of the questioned unarmed police officers were aware of the plans or how to access them.
They also thought they didn’t know what to do in response to a terrorist attack, he heard the inquiry.
Service inspectors questioned in another focus group said they felt “ill-prepared” and that the force should do more to train and test unarmed uniformed personnel. An inspector said that specific training “can really save lives”.
In November 2016, the findings were given to assistant police chief Cath Hankinson, who is now assistant police chief of the West Yorkshire Police. During that time, the level of terrorist threat in the UK was serious.
Mr. Buchan confirmed to Frank Howell, representing GMP, that he had not made notes about his meeting with Mrs. Hankinson and that there was no follow-up letter or written document between him and GMP.
He agreed with Mr. Howell that the meeting would not have lasted more than an hour.