What followed, instead, was an annus horribilis for Russia, and perhaps Putin’s most challenging year to date.
When Covid-19 started to spread around the world, Russia for a brief moment seemed to be ahead. The country closed its border with China and Putin boasted that the virus was “under control”, thanks to what he described as robust initial measures to stem the spread of the disease.
But this approach was little more than bragging and beating around the bush. Shortly after the government announced a national blockade that began on March 28, it became clear that the country was grappling with a major public health crisis.
The government was forced to postpone the referendum on constitutional changes.
Doubts grew about how well the Kremlin was handling the pandemic and whether it was being harassed by the Russian public about the seriousness of the crisis.
Russia’s economic situation was also dire. The country was mired in a coronavirus-induced recession, exacerbated by falling global oil prices, a major export.
This deep economic stress threatened to derail the ruling party’s United Russia political program by exposing the deep weaknesses of the social pact that kept Putin in power for two decades.
Putin’s political durability is often attributed to a simple bargain between him and his citizens: accepting limited political competition in exchange for stability and steady increases in the standard of living. But in the midst of the pandemic, that agreement began to break.
Lukashenko, who has governed since 1994, refused to step aside and his security forces brutalized and arrested thousands of Belarusians, leaving the Kremlin in the face of the uncomfortable scenario of citizens of a neighboring and ally country refusing to play with false Russian-style democracy. .
The Kremlin managed to hold a national referendum that guaranteed constitutional changes, with the help of a national campaign to get votes, a state holiday and the mobilization of the country’s large state sector, which accounts for a large part of the workers.
Navalny had been leading a campaign called “smart voting” – an effort to get votes for candidates in local elections who had the best chance of defeating United Russia’s candidates.
The Kremlin critic was eventually taken to Berlin for treatment, after Russian doctors initially insisted that the opposition leader was seriously ill to make the trip.
The Kremlin denied any attempt to harm Navalny, and Russian state television developed a series of conspiracy theories to explain the apparent assassination attempt.
But the Russian government has drawn swift criticism from international leaders, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel saying, “There are very serious questions now that only the Russian government can and must answer.”
Navalny’s poisoning, in fact, demolished much of the goodwill that Russia had sought to build internationally in the midst of the pandemic.
The Russian government also supported efforts to develop a coronavirus vaccine, a project that has become a matter of national prestige.
The outbreak of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region further tested the Russian government’s crisis management skills in 2020.
Although the brief but intensely bloody fighting ended with the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, the ceasefire agreement also demonstrated Turkey’s regional influence. Russia is no longer the only indispensable power in the post-Soviet space.
Kremlinology is an inexact science, but as 2020 approaches its end, we can ask whether Putin is reconsidering the apparent plans to remain president until 2036.
The project in no way implies the Russian president’s imminent departure – after all, Putin is a man who likes to keep his options open.
But for some observers, the bill recalled the surprising transfer of power from former Russian President Boris Yeltsin to then Prime Minister Putin on New Year’s Eve 1999. One of Putin’s first acts as president was the signing of a diploma granting immunity to Yeltsin.
The end of this convulsive and difficult year, then, is likely to leave avid observers in Russia waiting for new Putin New Year surprises.